Endogenous Monetary Growth Rules and Determinacy in Cash-in-Advance Models by Mark Weder





It is well known that a high degree of relative risk aversion induces equilibrium
indeterminacy in cash−in−advance economies. I find that by endogenously adjusting the
nominal money supply to output fluctuations, these equilibria can be effectively eliminated.
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Over the course of the recent years, it has become fashionable in macroeco-
nomics to formulate monetary policy as Taylor rules, i.e. it is assumed that
the central bank targets the short-run nominal interest rate in response to
economic variables such as in‡ation or output. In fact, many central banks’
policies are exemplary of this rule – at least over certain periods.
In the current paper, monetary policy is alternatively formulated so that
it is nominal money supply growth that reacts to output movements. Phrased
alternatively, the monetary authority regulates money injections but leaves
interest rates to be determined by market forces. The motivation for using
money supply rules is as follows. First, in a sense, there exists an corre-
spondence between the two formulations of policy: every interest rate rule
endogenously determines money supply and vice versa. Nevertheless, the
policy-e¤ects of using growth rates instead of interest rates as an instrument
may di¤er and are therefore analyzed here individually. Second, versions of
money supply rules have been adapted by several central banks over time.
For example, it was the Bundesbank’s proclaimed policy to keep money
growth within announced growth-target corridors. This policy had obviously
been formulated in response to economic conditions. In 1979 the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England dropped interest rate targets in favor of
money supply rules. These policy switches were dramatically less successful
than the Bundesbank’s record. Faced with these results, these ”monetarist
experiments” were abandoned a few years later.
The current paper employs monetary policy to stabilize the aggregate
economy. In particular, it asks if a well-de…ned endogenous money-growth
policy is able to eliminate cycles that arise in response to (self-ful…lling) ex-
pectations.1 The speci…c monetary economy which is considered here builds
on the standard cash-in-advance superstructure. It is well established that
the cash-in-advance model displays sunspot equilibria for large values of the
relative risk aversion parameter (see for example Farmer, 1999). The reason
for real indeterminacy is as follows. Suppose that people increase current
consumption without any cause other than believing that it is best to do so:
they follow some extrinsic sunspot signal. The consumption surge implies an
increase in the expected in‡ation rate which decreases future consumption.
Unless the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high – i.e. risk aversion
1In a companion paper, Weder (2003) examines the related e¤ects of interest rate rules.is low – the fall in future consumption does not generate a strong enough
e¤ect on today’s consumption and the fall is thereby not strong enough to
defeat the initial beliefs. The present note shows that the central bank can
preempt such self-ful…lling equilibria quite easily by simply obeying endoge-
nous monetary growth rules.
2 Model
The model is a dynamic general equilibrium model. The economy is pop-
ulated by atomistic …rm-households of measure one. Money is introduced
by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption purchases. All
markets are perfectly competitive and prices are perfectly ‡exible.
2.1 Preferences and technology











¡ Alt 0 < ¯ < 1; ¾ > 0, A > 0
where ¯ denotes the discount factor, ct consumption, lt labor and ¾ is the
coe¢cient of relative risk-aversion.2 E0 is the usual rational expectations
operator. The cash-in-advance constraint
Mt + Nt ¸ Ptct
states that period t nominal consumption purchases must be covered by the
agents’ cash holdings, Mt at the beginning of period t and the current period’s
lump-sum transfers from the central bank, Nt. Pt stands for the price level.
The production technology is given by
yt = lt:
2The assumption of indivisible labor was made to buy convenience of the analytical
evaluation. All results carry over for less elastic labor supplies. See also footnote 4.
22.2 Policy
There is no government consumption. The central bank follows a money
supply growth rule. Nominal money supply, Ms












I assume that monetary policy targets output movements. That is, policy is
described by the time-invariant function
Gt = G(yt+¿=y) Gt > 0rt: (1)
Here, y > 0 denotes the economy’s steady state. Policies that imply ¿ = 0
are coined current-looking. If ¿ = 1 (¿ = ¡1), policy is forward-looking
(backward-looking). Policies in which the central bank accommodates out-
put movements are given by G0 > 0. In some sense, this response could
be interpreted as taming in‡ationary pressures arising from overheating eco-
nomic activities. Leaning-against-the-wind policies imply that G0 < 0.
Let is be clear that the present paper does not necessarily claim that
any central bank actually follows this class of rules. Even the Bundesbank’s
growth targets were most likely less rigidly formulated than in (1).3 What
the current paper does claim, however, is that (i) assumed growth-rules have
prime e¤ects on aggregate dynamics and (ii) they can be exploited to stabilize
the economy. These suppositions will be analyzed in the next Section.
3 Equilibrium dynamics
In symmetric equilibrium, Ms
t = Mt and yt = lt = ct must hold for rt. Let us
begin the discussion of dynamics by considering backward-looking policies.
3Moreover, the Bundesbank’s targets may be better described as being determined by
in‡ation.
33.1 Backward-looking policies
Under the backward-looking policy Gt = G(yt¡1=y), the model reduces to


















is evaluated at the unique economy’s steady state. Figure 1 plots the de-
terminacy (D) and indeterminacy (I) regions. The following results emerge.
When the central bank reacts to economic ‡uctuations by a su¢cient de-
gree, then sunspot equilibria can be pre-emptied. More concretely, unlike
the case in which the central bank follows an exogenous money-growth pol-
icy, the current cash-in-advance model is determinate even when the relative
risk aversion parameter is greater than 2. For example, when setting ¾ = 3,
which is entirely reasonable from an empirical standpoint, then either ´ < ¡3
or ´ > 1 delivers unique dynamics. No general monetary policy appears to
allow the central bank to rule out endogenous ‡uctuations independent of the
degree of risk-aversion. That is, the central bank must have knowledge of the
risk parameter before …xing the policy rule – however it su¢ces to possesses
a general idea of the parameter’s empirical magnitude.4 Most economists
would agree that the parameter falls somewhere in the range of 1 to 5. Suf-
…cient accommodation of output movements – i.e. ´ = 3 or larger – always
preempt sunspot equilibria.
4If I had asumed the more general utility function u(:) = (1 ¡ ¾)¡1c1¡¾ ¡ À(lt), then





where " ¸ 0 stands for the inverse of the Frischian labor supply. Consequentely, the
determinacy conditions are simply shifted.
4Intuitively, the mechanism that keeps in check the sunspot forces can
be thought of like this. Changes in consumption imply changes in output.
Once the central bank targets output, the supply of money adjusts to the
incipient sunspot belief. Policy causes the transformation of the dynamics.
In the model with constant money growth, the initial sunspot-caused surge
in consumption is met by a drop in future consumption. Once ¾ > 2, the








keeps the sunspot tilt of yt in check. On the other side, in the model with
variable money growth, the initial sunspot-caused movement in consumption
is supported by a reaction of the growth rate. That is, depending on the size













can be stationary (i.e. indeterminacy) or unstable (i.e. determinacy). In
sum, simple policy rules can eliminate sunspot equilibria by destabilizing the
economy. Curiously, the analysisdoes not pin down the direction of monetary
policy: all that matters for uniqueness is that the central bank’s reaction to
changes in the economy is considerably forceful. However, a caveat to this
…nding does exist: the policy’s successcrucially depends on the central bank’s
ability to control money aggregates. Otherwise the bank may run intochoppy
water similar to that experienced by the Federal Reserve in the early 1980s.
Even the otherwise celebrated record of the Bundesbank shows 11 misses out
of the 24 targets for monetary growth the bank announced.
3.2 Current-looking policies
When policy is current-looking, the local dynamics are given by
Etb yt+1 =
1
1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ´
b yt:
Now, determinacy requires that policy falls into a narrow band that describes
an inverse relationship between ¾ and ´ (see Figure 2). For example, when
5the relative risk aversion parameter is equal to 2, the model is determinate if
and only if ´ 2 (¡2;0). The complementarity of the e¤ects of intertemporal
substitution and the money rule elasticity is easily understood. The mild
response is required since the money supply now grows hand in hand with
t+1 output: large values of ´ are equivalent to assuming high risk aversion.
Moreover, as in the scenario of backward-looking rules, no policy exists that
e¤ectively rules out endogenous ‡uctuations independently of the degree of
risk aversion.
3.3 Forward-looking policies








and the local dynamics are given by
´Etb yt+2 ¡ (1 ¡¾)Etb yt+1 + b yt = 0: (3)
Determinacy requires that both roots of (3) must lay outside the unit circle.
Figure 3 summarizes the dynamical structure. In a nutshell, policy must
not show too strong responses to expected output ‡uctuations. Is it possible
to sift out a general strategy that can eliminate sunspot equilibria for all
reasonable values of ¾? The answer again is: no. Quite on the contrary,
the space of desirable forward-looking rules is small in the following sense.
Money-growth rules are only able to eliminate sunspot equilibria for ¾ <
3. On this account, forward-looking policies are not able to counter the
indeterminacy e¤ects of high degrees of relative risk aversion.
4 Summary
In recent years, it has become fashionable to formulate monetary policy in
the form of Taylor rules. According to this, it is assumed that the central
bank sets the short-run nominal interest rate in response to macroeconomic
variables. The current paper presents policy in an alternative framework: it
is nominal money growth that endogenously reacts to macroeconomic activ-
ity. The main insight that emerges from this paper is that monetary policy
6can be used to eliminate sunspot equilibria. This is shown within a monetary
model in which indeterminacy solely arises from preferences: it is well known
that high degrees of relative risk aversion induce multiple equilibria in cash-
in-advance economies. I …nd that by endogenously adjusting nominal money
supply growth to output ‡uctuations, these equilibria can be e¤ectively elim-
inated. Policies that accommodate past output ‡uctuations constitute this
kind of a preemptive strategy.
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Figure 3: Forward-looking rules: dynamics
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